trauma that leader experiences, brought about by feelings of ultimate responsibility, can be crushing and can make him ineffective as a leader.

Walking this tightrope successfully depends upon the individual leader's human as well as professional qualities. Aside from developing his own competence, his most important goal should be the establishment of the ties of loyalty upon which trust grows. It is almost axiomatic that a leader who is not trusted will not hold that position of responsibility for long or function effectively in it while he does.

Some of us may have known leaders who seemed to equate being loyal subordinates with being "yes men." Perception, of course, is not always reality, but it must be understood that what superiors and subordinates alike perceive is often reality for *them*. Therefore, just as he must establish a good relationship with his subordinates, he must also establish a relationship with his superiors that is loyal yet wholly professional.

A loyal subordinate can be defined as one who states his opinion candidly but who loyally executes his superiors' orders as though they were his own. Any soldier who strives to live up to the precepts of this definition knows the pitfalls—in some cases, his own subordinates will view him as a "yes man" or worse.

To keep such perceptions from becoming the reality for his subordinates, a leader must loyally support his subordinates. It is his loyal support to them that encourages initiative, forgives honest errors, and in turn develops loyalty in them. Loyalty is never given, though; it is earned. A leader who demands the support of his subordinates but fails to support them is a fool. This may mean supporting them in some cases even if he believes they are wrong. Leaders should encourage their subordinates and avoid being negative at all costs.

Counseling is a key to developing loyal relationships. Unfortunately, though, counseling has come to have a negative connotation in the Army. But counseling sessions, formal and informal, that concentrate on the positive aspects of a subordinate leader's performance cultivate the tie that binds.

In the best interests of both the individual and the organization, those who, in the leader's view, will never make the grade have to be relieved of the responsibilities of leadership. Any officer or noncommissioned officer who has had to "fire" a subordinate leader knows how difficult it can be. Yet the officer or NCO's first loyalty within his organization must be to the unit as a whole and not to individuals. Again, lives may hang in the balance.

In summary, there are few more emotionally charged subjects in our service than loyalty. But the essential truths are these:

- Genuine loyalty cannot be bought or sold. It can only be given freely, and therein lies its greatest value.
- Loyalty is a two-way street. Leaders who want their subordinates' loyalty have to earn it.
- The only way to earn their loyalty is by first being loyal to them. An officer or NCO must stand up for his subordinates.
- The loyalty that a leader owes to his superiors is directly related to his loyalty to the nation and his oath.

Despite all of the issues that have been raised, though, and regardless of personal feelings, unless a directive is illegal or immoral, a superior's orders must be loyally obeyed. A leader can take issue with his boss and, if time allows, even go over his head. But for a leader in combat, time will be a luxury. Ultimately, the oath he takes must take precedence over his personal feelings or professional opinions. In the final analysis, loyalty to his nation outweighs all other considerations.

Finally, returning to the captain who told me about his test of loyalty with his battalion commander and his decision to follow orders that he did not agree with, it is difficult to see how he could have done otherwise.

Major Robert B. Adolph, Jr., recently volunteered for United Nations Military Observer duty in the Middle East. He was previously Deputy Chief, Special Operations Proponency Office, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg. His articles and book reviews have appeared in numerous publications.

Map Course Distances

MAJOR CHARLES F. COFFIN III

Setting up a good map-reading course is tough work. If you're lucky, you have one nearby that has been checked for accuracy and guaranteed correct. But you may not be that lucky, especially if you are in an Army Reserve or National Guard unit. And even if there is a course nearby, you may not be able to use it when you want to—another unit may have priority, the scheduling may not work with your unit's training plan, or the course just isn't suitable for the kind of map-reading training you want to conduct.

Whatever the reason, one day you may

be directed to set up "a good azimuth-and-pace course." The key word, of course, is "good."

In addition to checking the knowledge soldiers have gained in a classroom, a map-reading course must also build confidence—especially when you're training people who are not familiar with map and compass work. And nothing destroys confidence more quickly than an inaccurate map course. (Who among us has not spent an extra hour or more on a map course somewhere looking for a point that wasn't where we knew it had to be? How much worse is it, then, for a young soldier who hasn't done much map reading, isn't quite sure what he is doing, and is trying to make sense of it all?)

Accuracy, then, is a must. But how do you get it?

Since much of the teaching that I do—and probably much that you do—in both orienteering and ordinary map reading concentrates on the ability to move from place to place, I am very concerned with distance. How far is it, exactly, from here to there? The goal, then, is to verify the accuracy of such "dead reckoning" distances.

Let's assume you have a piece of ground you're reasonably satisfied with and you're going out to place your points. You must place them accurately, within eight digits. Use intersection, resection, terrain association, modified resection, or satellite photos, if you can get them. Do *not*, however, use your pace count to measure distances between points. That's what we're going to verify. But you *can* plot the points—to eight digits—on your map as you're setting this up and then plot the presumed distances on it.

First, though, let's do a quick review from a slightly different perspective.

Every point we plot on a map can be viewed as the corner of a right triangle. We read map coordinates "right and up." Any point is the intersection between a North/South (vertical) gridline and an East/West (horizontal) gridline. These lines always form the corner of a right triangle (Figure 1). (None of this is new; you probably had it in your first map-reading course and in every one since.)

If any point can be expressed as being part of a right triangle, then the distance



FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2

doesn't jibe, that things don't seem to be accurate. There are five possibilities.

- **Your pace count is wrong.** Double check it.
- **Your azimuth is wrong.** Double check it, both on the ground and on the map. And have someone else check your work.
- **The points weren't accurately placed.** You'll have to recheck *everything*.
- **Your map is wrong.** It may be, but you'll have to be very sure that it is before you discard it or alter it based on this possibility.
- **You have done your math incorrectly.** Check the figures again and make sure you fed the calculator the right numbers.

Once you have checked these five possibilities, you should be able to eliminate any errors on your course.

In sum, setting up and checking a good map course requires some time and effort, but they are hours well spent, and they will pay high dividends.

If you are going to train your soldiers to the same high standards you hold for yourself, you must make every effort to see that they have the tools they need—precisely accurate courses and good instruction.

Then the errors they make will be their own. You can work with them, find what they are doing wrong, and correct them. But the successes they achieve, the confidence they build, the skills they develop will be their own, unsullied by faulty tools. And they deserve no less. They're *your* soldiers.

Major Charles F. Coffin III was commissioned in Infantry in 1974 and recently transferred to Special Forces. He has served as an enlisted man and an officer in Ranger, Special Forces, airborne infantry, and other assignments, including one tour in Vietnam. He has served in the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve, and has been in Active Guard Reserve status since 1981. He is presently assigned as an Assistant Professor of Military Science at Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana.

Hasty River Crossings

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN E. RUNALS

Since 1982, the AirLand Battle concept has described the U.S. Army's doctrinal approach to generating and focusing combat power for operational and tactical planning and for field operations. Resting as it does on the four basic tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization, the concept offers the Army an opportunity to fight outnumbered and win. While all four of these tenets are essential to battlefield success, a quick look at just one aspect of Soviet tactical doctrine, river crossing operations, reveals that the U.S. Army is not alone in the importance it places on initiative.

Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. believe that the fluid nature of future warfare will require tactical forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to move rapidly over extended distances and strike at the enemy's vulnerabilities. However, Soviet studies have found that on a European battlefield, combat forces can expect to encounter water obstacles up to 100 meters wide every 35 to 60 kilometers, between 100 and 300 meters wide every 100 to 150 kilometers, and greater than 300 meters wide every 250 to 300 kilometers. To be successful in maintaining the initiative and the tempo of operations that is required on such a battlefield, therefore, U.S. and Soviet forces must be able to breach these numerous water obstacles quickly. The assault or hasty river crossing is one solution both armies have identified to meet this requirement.

HIGH TEMPO

The Soviets view a tactical river crossing as either an assault crossing from the march or a deliberate crossing. In keepng with their view that success on the battlefield can be achieved only if they maintain a high tempo of operations, Soviet doctrine, in reality, places little emphasis on the deliberate crossing. Soviet tactical literature insists that even wide rivers defended by well-organized forces can be assaulted and crossed from the march. Assault crossings are characterized by forces moving toward a river on a broad front in normal march formation while maintaining a high rate of advance. The doctrine therefore emphasizes prior planning and the use of specially organized forward detachments.

A decision to cross a water barrier from the march is made as early as possible to allow enough time for organizing and positioning forces and equipment for the anticipated crossing. The Soviets use their available intelligence information to identify only those possible crossing sites that best conform to their operational requirements. Naturally, potential crossing sites are selected in areas where the banks and approach routes require a minimum of engineer preparation. Once those possible sites have been identified, engineer reconnaissance patrols are sent out to identify the actual crossing locations. Forward detachments, operating two to three hours ahead of the main body, are then directed to advance to the selected crossing sites, bypassing enemy forces as